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ENFORCING SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD
AGREEMENTS:
THE TROUBLE WITH SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
SUSAN M. WOLF *
INTRODUCTION
When a surrogate mother' decides that she wants to keep
the baby, what should we do? Probably the most common re-
sponse is that we should enforce the surrogacy contract in spe-
cific performance by compelling the surrogate to surrender the
child and all parental rights-"a deal is a deal." Indeed, the trial
court in Baby "M" did just that.2
* Associate for Law, The Hastings Center, Briarcliff Manor, New York; A.B.,
Princeton University, 1975; J.D., Yale Law School, 1980. Many have discussed these is-
sues at length with me. I would like to thank Janet Benshoof; Daniel Callahan; Sidney
Callahan; Larry Gostin; Joan Mahoney; Deborah Merritt; Norman Redlich; Nadine
Taub; Wendy Williams; William Wolf, Jr.; and the N.Y.U. faculty lunch for particularly
helpful comments and debate. Harriet Fischer of Cardozo Law School supplied valuable
research assistance. The research for this article was partially supported by the Green-
wall and Pettus Crowe Foundations, for which I am grateful.
1. A surrogate mother may be gestational only, if another woman (such as the woman
expecting to rear the child) contributes the egg. See The Ethics Committee of the Ameri-
can Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies, 46
FERTILITY AND STERILITY 58(S) (Supp. 1, 1986). Most surrogates, however, are both ge-
netic and gestational, see id., as was Mary Beth Whitehead, the surrogate in the Baby
"M" case. In re Baby "M," 217 N.J. Super. 313, 344-45, 525 A.2d 1128, 1143, cert.
granted, 107 N.J. 140, 526 A.2d 203 (1987). I focus in this article on the surrogate who is
in that most common category.
2. Baby "M," 217 N.J. Super. at 398, 525 A.2d at 1170-71. The court awarded specific
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Certainly, there is much to commend the "deal is a deal"
approach. It is in many ways the simplest answer to the dispute,
simpler than worrying about whether the surrogate asserts the
kind of maternal claim that ought to be recognized. Creating a
rule of specific enforcement yields great predictability-parties
to a surrogacy contract will know that their agreement will be
enforced by its terms. The rule also vindicates the sanctity of
contract; having given your word, you are bound to go through
with your promise. The facts of the Baby "M" case have surely
added to the enthusiasm for this rule-by enforcing the contract
in specific performance, the trial court could with one fell blow
vindicate the sanctity of contract, award the child to the edu-
cated professional people (like many of "us"), and punish Mrs.
Whitehead for flouting the court's authority.' There are, in
short, many reasons-some seemingly dispassionate matters of
doctrine and policy preference, others not-for responding to
the complexity and emotionality of the dispute with a curt "a
deal is a deal" and so requiring specific performance.
It is an easy and in many ways a profoundly satisfying re-
sponse, but-this article suggests-a wrong one. The contract
should indeed be deemed enforceable; the analysis below merely
pauses to review the reasons why. The focus here is on the mode
of enforcement, and the folly of using the full and extraordinary
powers of the state (complete with police enforcement, con-
tempt, and jail) to wrest a child from a fit4 and desiring mother
and terminate her parental rights.
Part I of this article presents the context for the problem of
how to enforce surrogacy agreements-the crossroads at which
society stands in deciding how to view all of the new collabora-
tive forms of reproduction. Part II explores the allure of specific
performance as the means of enforcement. Part III lays out the
arguments for rejecting it. Part IV sets forth an alternative ap-
proach that I claim better negotiates the shoals on which specific
performance after finding that to be consonant with the child's best interests. Id. at 390-
98, 525 A.2d at 1166-70. See infra pp. 396-98..
3. See infra text accompanying note 62.
4. Obviously, in some cases there might indeed be a showing that the surrogate is
unfit. However, the hard case for the question of whether and how to enforce a surrogacy
contract is the case in which the mother is fit and the only reason for removing the child
is the surrogacy agreement itself.
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performance founders.
I. THE CONTEXT FOR THE QUANDARY
We have arrived at a pivotal moment with regard to not
only surrogacy but also the other forms of third-party genetic
and gestational collaboration in the reproductive process. Do we
permit them? If so, on what terms?
There are many types of collaborative reproduction. Surro-
gacy itself has two forms: by far the more common-and the one
I focus on here-in which the surrogate is both genetic and ges-
tational, as in the Baby "M" case, and purely gestational surro-
gacy in which the egg is not the surrogate's but the wife's or a
donor's. There are, of course, other reproductive techniques in-
volving third-party collaboration: artificial insemination with do-
nor sperm (AID)-the oldest and most familiar of all of these
techniques; in vitro fertilization (IVF) with donor sperm, donor
eggs, or both; and embryo transfer (ET) in which a female col-
laborator is inseminated with the husband's sperm (or perhaps a
donor's) and the fertilized egg is then transferred to the wife for
gestation.5 Given so many potential collaborators in the repro-
ductive process, plus the intermediaries who may broker the ar-
rangements, the looming question is how to deal with the vari-
ous agreements among them when they break down, and what
limits or structure we should impose. Will we go the route of
treating these as purely commercial arrangements and impose
the law of the marketplace, or somehow develop a body of law
more tailored to the subject matter-children, reproduction, and
parental relationships?
Of all the forms of third-party collaboration, surrogacy
poses that question in starkest terms and is the most problem-
atic. It is the only form of collaboration involving nine months of
gestational collaboration. A sperm or egg donor collaborates for
a much more limited period of time and at the end of the dona-
tive act parts with gametes, not a child. Sperm donation is often
5. Throughout this article I refer to the people seeking to use surrogacy or other
forms of reproduction as a "couple" and as a "husband" and "wife." However, clearly a
single person, two unmarried people, or people of the same gender could use various
collaborative forms of reproduction. My terminology is in part a matter of ease in keep-
ing the players straight, and in part keyed to the facts of the Baby "M" case, in which
the people using surrogacy were a husband and wife.
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likened to surrogacy, but in fact the counterpart to sperm dona-
tion is egg donation. There is no male collaboration comparable
to surrogacy. Biology-at least until we figure out how males can
perform the gestational function-enforces an asymmetry.
Surrogacy-in particular, genetic and gestational surro-
gacy-is also the form of collaboration that looks, and is, most
like simply reproducing rather than collaborating. A surrogate
who is genetic and gestational goes through all of the acts that a
traditional mother does, except that the mode of fertilization is
artificial insemination and she parts with the child after birth.
It is not surprising, then, that surrogacy is the most contro-
versial of the collaborative reproductive techniques. Numerous
state legislatures have been grappling with conflicting legislative
proposals.' A bill has been introduced in Congress to ban com-
mercial surrogacy.8 The Vatican has called for a ban." In some
countries bans have been enacted. 0 In this country, conference
after conference becomes the scene of fierce disagreement, and
the battle rages.
II. THE ALLURE OF THE SIMPLE SOLUTION
For every problem, there is a solution that is short, simple
and wrong.
-H.L. Mencken
In the whirlwind of debate over surrogacy-and especially
over what to do when the surrogate wants to keep the
child-there is something enormously appealing about simply
enforcing the contract as written. It is a kind of haven in the
storm. Part of the appeal is obvious: Competent adults agreed to
these terms; we will simply make them go through with their
6. Indeed, a traditional mother may also conceive through artificial insemination and
give up the child after birth.
7. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1987, at A34, col. 1.
8. H.R. 2433, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
9. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for Human
Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation, ETHICS & MEDICS (Supp. Apr.
1987).
10. See Brahams, The Hasty British Ban on Commercial Surrogacy, 17 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 16 (Feb. 1987); Singer, Making Laws on Making Babies, 15 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 5 (Aug. 1985) (Victoria, Australia); Health Ministry Forbids Surrogate
Motherhood, Associated Press (May 17, 1987) (available through NEXIS) (Israel).
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promises. Moreover, the contracting couple11 relied on the surro-
gate's performance-the husband invested his sperm; the couple
are ready and eager; the crib is set up and waiting. When a
couple engage a surrogate, it is claimed, they should be able to
count on the outcome; otherwise, few will take the risk.
More reasons are offered: Warning potential surrogates that
their initial commitment is irrevocable will appropriately dis-
courage those who cannot discharge the weighty obligation.
Without ironclad guarantees to prospective users of surrogacy,
the practice will dwindle and this fledgling industry will fail.1" In
any case, as the arguments run, there is no adequate remedy to
compensate the couple for the loss of the child-they must have
the child him- or herself."3
These arguments, and others like them, are often recited.
There is nothing surprising about any one of them. I respond to
them below in Part III. Yet these supposed reasons are in some
sense the superficial justifications, not the deep and powerful
draw. They are the arguably good reasons; it is far from clear
that they are the real reasons.
Enforcing the contract in specific performance has more
than a doctrinal appeal or policy advantage; it has a profound
allure. The allure lies in the relief this solution seems to offer
from harrowing conflicts awakened in us by surrogacy itself.
This section explores three of those conflicts. My contention in
this section is that enforcing the contract in specific performance
is appealing because it seems to resolve those conflicts. But it
does not. It merely denies a part of the problem rather than in-
tegrating the pieces to produce a true resolution.
Among the conflicts that surrogacy provokes are three par-
ticularly fundamental ones. The first is that surrogacy arrange-
ments challenge the boundary between the commercial and per-
11. Throughout this article I refer to the couple awaiting the transfer of the child
from the surrogate as the "contracting couple." Often, as in the Baby "M" case, only the
husband is actually a party to the contract, to avoid conflict with the statutes prohibiting
payment in connection with an adoption. See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
This technicality is without consequence for my argument, so for simplicity's sake I refer
to the "contracting couple" herein.
12. A leading practitioner in the field of surrogacy, however, has argued to the con-
trary. Speech by Noel P. Keane addressing the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, May 18, 1987.
13. See Baby "M," 217 N.J. Super. at 389, 525 A.2d at 1166.
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sonal." The dispute over the child pits two conflicting
paradigms against one another, so that those who see the surro-
gate mother as performing services or producing a good pursu-
ant to contract deny her other identity as a mother.'5 Second,
recognizing the parental claims of all involved in this kind of
dispute-the surrogate mother and the contracting couple-is
profoundly confusing. Once we see the surrogate mother as a
type of mother, we are cast adrift-without a clear gut sense of
who we should favor for the role of parent. This then raises a
spectre: children who are the products of the new collaborative
reproductive technologies beginning life despite deep confusion
about who should be seen as the parents. Third, we are in a pe-
riod of substantial confusion over whether the body, including
the reproductive cells and uterus, should be considered property
that can be bought or rented in the marketplace. A surrogate's
sale or rental of her body and its reproductive services is partic-
ularly troubling because it seems to commodify the resultant
child as well.
Our deepest anxieties over how these issues should be re-
solved have much to teach us about the way in which contrac-
tual and equitable principles should be melded in resolving
these disputes. I conclude that we ought to recognize both the
commercial and personal dimensions of the dispute rather than
dichotomizing them. Moreover, we have already passed the point
of limiting a child's parents to two. Although novel parental ar-
14. I use the term "personal" to designate that realm ordinarily conceived as being
non-commercial and exempt from commercial principles of conduct. Cf. Kennedy, The
Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1354-55
(1982) (discussing the public/private distinction, the most private being parents); Radin,
Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) (contrasting those activities and
things that we consider to be in the market realm from those we consider outside that
realm, and analyzing where and how that line should be drawn). This includes the "fa-
milial" but is not limited to it-a single person with no family may nonetheless engage in
personal activities.
15. Some of the debate over the Baby "M" case has proceeded as if the surrogate is
something other than a parent. See, e.g., William Handel, Crossfire, Cable Network
News, Aug. 27, 1986 (claiming that the surrogate is not a mother). References to the
surrogate mother as simply a womb for rent also treat her as something other than a
parent. Compare such rejection of the personal side of surrogacy and exclusive focus on
the commercial, with the claim that "lawyers divide life into the 'professional' and the
'personal'" and that this can lead to a "disregard of complex and nuanced realities that
don't fit into neat legal categories," Gewirtz, A Lawyer's Death, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2053,
2055-56 (1987).
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rangements involving more than two adults may still be unset-
tling, we should not falsely focus our discomfort with this on
surrogacy disputes by regarding the surrogate mother as an ex-
tra person who is something other than a parent. Resolving
these disputes requires recognizing that the surrogate mother is,
indeed, one of several people with parental claims to the child.
Finally, although we are in a transitional period, working out our
conclusions about the treatment of the body as property and,
indeed, about the purchase in some senses of children, enforcing
the contract as a purely commercial one goes too far in the com-
modification of children.
A. The Commercial versus the Personal
When a surrogate mother decides she wants to keep the
child, what was supposed to be a commercial relationship to the
child has become a personal one. The surrogate mother was sup-
posed to conceive, carry, and give birth, but form no bond to the
child. She was to produce and then absolutely surrender the
child, pursuant to an arm's length contract with a stranger for a
fee.16 When the rare surrogate17 discovers that despite her intent
she has bonded to the child, a relationship that was supposed to
be the commercial one of producer/product has become one of
the most personal and intimate-mother/child.
Surrogacy challenges the boundary between the commercial
and the personal-both where the boundary is and where the
boundary should be as a matter of law. There are some realms
so personal that the law does not apply ordinary commercial
contract standards. Promises to marry are an example; although
16. Although this article focuses on the enforcement of surrogacy arrangements when
there is a contract involved, surrogacy may also proceed without a contract, without a
fee, and between people who are not strangers. See L. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONS: A
CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO THE NEWEST INFERTILITY TREATMENTS 185-86 (rev. ed. 1985) [here-
inafter NEW CONCEPTIONS] (reporting use of family members or an acquaintance); N.Y.
Times, Apr. 9, 1987, at Al, col. 1 (reporting a mother carrying her infertile daughter's
offspring);M. WARNOCK, A QUESTION OF LIFE 42-43 (1984) (referring to surrogacy with no
money involved, such as when a sister is used); N. KEANE & D. BREO, THE SURROGATE
MOTHER 268-70, 275 (1981) (unpaid volunteer surrogates).
17. Of the hundreds of surrogacies reported, the surrogate has changed her mind and
decided to keep the child in only a handful of cases. See, e.g., A. v. C., [1985] F.L.R. 445
(Fain. & C.A. 1978); NEW CONCEPTIONS, supra note 16, at 193, 209, 212 (reporting in-
stances in which a surrogate changed her mind).
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at one time, breach gave rise to a cause of action, many states by
statute now refuse to enforce such promises at all. 8 Closer to
the surrogacy case would be contracts to surrender parental
rights, contracts to give up a child for adoption, and custody
agreements. Here the courts will sometimes provide enforce-
ment, but only by applying modified contract standards. 9 Some
of the modifications are articulated in statute;20 some flow from
the courts' parens patriae duty to protect the interests of
children.'
Our laws on relinquishing parental rights already reject the
simple application of commercial standards and, instead, impose
more protective procedures. By statute in a number of states, a
parent cannot agree to relinquish parental rights or surrender a
child for adoption until a certain length of time has elapsed af-
ter the child's birth." Once given, consent to give up the child
18. S. GREEN & J. LONG, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LAW AGREEMENTS §§ 2.02-2.03 (1984
& Supp. 1987).
19. See, e.g., GREEN & LONG, supra note 18, at 311 n.692 and statutes cited therein
(termination of parental rights); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-11 (Supp. 1985) (revocation of con-
sent to adoption); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. XIII, § 909 (1986) (same); In re Sarah K, 66
N.Y.2d 223, 487 N.E.2d 241, 496 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1985), cert. denied sub nom., Kosher v.
Stamatis, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986) (same); A.L. v. P.A., 213 N.J. Super. 391, 514 A.2d 494
(1986), cert. denied, 107 N.J. 110, 526 A.2d 181 (1987) (same); Unif. Adoption Act, 9
U.L.A. 8, 19 (1979) (revocation of consent to adoption and to termination of parental
rights); Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962) (court may modify custody decree based on
changed circumstances); Crocker v. Crocker, 195 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1952) (custody con-
tract will not be binding if detrimental to child's best interest); Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J.
42, 491 A.2d 606 (1984) (explanation of basis for court's willingness to allow change in
custody); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 383(5) (McKinney 1983) (custody award based on child's
best interests); Unif. Marriage and Divorce Act § 409, 9A U.L.A. 628 (1987) (modifiability
of custody decree); GREEN & LONG, supra note 18, at 226 (courts may always modify
custody agreements); Hollinger, Informed Consent Needed for Specific Performance,
N.J.L.J., Feb. 26, 1987, at 32, 33.
20. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-11 (Supp. 1985 & Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
XIII, § 909 (Supp. 1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115(b) (McKinney Supp. 1987); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 199.500(5) (Michie 1982 & Supp. 1986); see also GREEN & LONG, supra note
18, at 311 n.692 and statutes cited therein.
21. See, e.g., State ex rel. O'Sullivan v. Heart Ministries, Inc., 227 Kan. 244, 607 P.2d
1102, appeal dismissed sub. nom., Heart Ministries, Inc. v. Kansas, 449 U.S. 802 (1980);
Olson v. Olson, 175 Mont. 444, 574 P.2d 1004 (1978); Sheehan v. Sheehan, 38 N.J. Super.
120, 118 A.2d 89 (1955).
22. GREEN & LONG, supra note 18, at 311 n.693 and statutes described therein; Hol-
linger, supra note 19, at 33 n.11 ("no state holds a biological mother to a pre-birth con-
tract to surrender her child," noting that a possible exception is Wyoming); NEW CON-
CEPTIONS, supra note 16, at 207 ("In Kentucky...the law provides that a woman may
not consent to terminate her parental rights or give her child up for adoption until five
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can be revoked with greater or lesser ease, depending on the
state. 2 At one extreme, some states allow consent to be revoked
at will;24 at the other extreme, only fraud or duress will
suffice.25
In the adoption context the purchase of a child is widely
forbidden,2 though as I indicate below, this prohibition is less
complete than it may seem at first. This is an effort to banish
commercial motives so that the decision to surrender the child is
not a commercial one. Nor do we apply strict commercial princi-
ples to custody agreements-various considerations will trump
the language of an agreement; a court can modify a custody
agreement whenever it is in the best interests of the child.2 7
As a matter of morality, too, rather than law, there is a line
we commonly draw between the commercial and personal are-
nas. One basis for condemning at least commercial if not all sur-
rogacy is that childbearing is not an act that should be under-
taken on a commercial basis. It should be done only for love, not
money, with the intent to cherish, not relinquish, the child.28
days after the baby's birth."); cf. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 108 Misc. 2d 1098, 439
N.Y.S.2d 255 (1981) (consent of mother to terminate parental rights prior to birth of
child is void ab initio since child must be born before consent is valid under N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 11-1(c)).
23. See Hollinger, supra note 19, at 33; see also supra notes 19-20.
24. See, e.g., Small v. Andrews, 20 Or. App. 6, 530 P.2d 540 (1975)(absent estoppel,
mother absolutely entitled to withdraw consent to adoption at any time prior to decree);
In re D.L.F., 85 S.D. 44, 176 N.W.2d 486 (1970)(because unwed mother revoked her
consent promptly, she did not lose her rights); Hendricks v. Curry, 401 S.W.2d 796 (Tex.
1966)(since child was not found to be abandoned or, neglected, mother allowed to revoke
her valid consent to adoption at any time before decree entered); In re Adoption of Gun-
ther, 416 Pa. 237, 206 A.2d 61 (1965)(because child was not abandoned, mother may
revoke consent before final adoption decree).
25. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 23 Ariz. App. 50, 530 P.2d 896
(1975)(mother's misunderstanding of finality of her signature on consent to adoption;
only fraud or duress will suffice under ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-107); In re Adoption of
Child, 114 N.J. Super. 584, 277 A.2d 566 (1971)(consent to adoption irrevocable, barring
fraud or some overriding equitable consideration).
26. See NEW CONCEPTIONS, supra note 16, at 294-95 (listing statutes in 24 states
prohibiting payment in connection with an adoption); Katz, Surrogate Motherhood and
the Baby-Selling Laws, 20 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 1, 8 n.34 (1986)(listing twenty-four
states that have enacted baby-broker acts to combat black market adoptions).
27. See, e.g., Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42, 491 A.2d 606 (1984); Sheehan v. Sheehan,
38 N.J. Super. 120, 118 A.2d 89 (1955); cf Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962)(welfare
of infant is paramount concern).
28. See Callahan, Surrogate Motherhood: A Bad Idea, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1987, at
A25, col. 2.
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The point is not the precise location of the line between the
personal and commercial, which can certainly be debated, but
the fact that there is a line at all. Surrogacy-especially when a
surrogate turns around and claims the child-provokes profound
disagreement because it is not clearly on one side or the other.
There is a commercial agreement to produce and surrender a
child; to that extent the surrogate's relationship to the child as
well as to the contracting couple is a commercial one. But the
surrogate is also the child's genetic and gestational mother; if
the surrogate cares for the child for some time after birth, she
will be to that extent also a rearing mother. This aspect of her
relationship to the child is distinctly non-commercial and
personal.
To claim that the surrogate is not a mother at all29 and that
we should simply force her to carry out the acts she has prom-
ised-as we might in more ordinary commercial contexts-is to
miss the problem, the dual character of surrogacy. Much of the
debate on what to do when the surrogate changes her mind rests
on a failure to see this dual character. Should we simply enforce
the contract-"a deal is a deal"-or ignore the contract and
treat the case as a custody dispute? The problem is often posed
as this choice-either contract or custody.30 This springs from
an inability to see the commercial and personal dimensions si-
multaneously. The dichotomy between contract and custody is a
false one-the dispute partakes of both. The solution must do
justice on both counts.
B. Multiple Parents
Current reproductive technologies raise the possibility that
four or more people might be involved in the production of one
child: the sperm donor, the egg donor, the gestating woman, and
one or more people to rear the child.3' Each might have a claim
to parental rights, as indeed might the spouses of at least some
29. See supra note 15.
30. See, e.g., Will, The Natural Mother, Washington Post, Jan. 22, 1987, at A21;
Mother Can't be Ignored in the case of Baby M, Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 9, 1986, at
6-E.
31. See Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Struc-
ture of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 1002 (1986) [hereinafter Procrea-
tive Liberty].
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of these participants. In comparison, the scenario of the surro-
gate mother versus the genetic father and his wife seems simple.
Yet surrogacy is among the reproductive methods that makes for
a disturbing proliferation of collaborators in reproduction. That
proliferation poses a challenge: As the reproductive process be-
comes divided into segments and apportioned among various
participants, it becomes harder for the observer to find guidance
in her head or heart as to who should get the child if the ar-
rangement breaks down.
To proliferate the number of participants is to push our ca-
pacity for understanding and empathy to the limit. It is not ob-
vious how to compare the different claims that could be made.
This proliferation, moreover, fundamentally challenges some of
our usual notions of identity. Traditional reproduction involves
only two people who between them play all the roles. When a
child has different genetic and rearing parents, sorting out the
child's identity becomes more complex. We are no longer clear
whose child this "really is" or should be. Faced with this confu-
sion, the temptation is great to pull back and simply deny the
fact that the surrogate is a mother asserting a maternal claim.
Contemplating other reproductive collaborations can reinforce
this. If surrogacy can generate three parental claims, other re-
productive arrangements will be able to generate more. Given
this potential, the impetus is to maintain that only the con-
tracting couple really qualify as parents and the surrogate is
merely the contractual producer. She is asserting a claim as a
usurper, not as a real parent-her attempted coup should be
crushed.
Yet it is chastening to realize that in more usual disputes
over children we have already recognized that more than two
people may lay parental claims to one child. Indeed, even grand-
parents may now assert claims. Thus, ordinary disputes can
themselves present a confusing proliferation of parental claims.
We should not single out surrogacy for the unique response of
denying the parental nature of one of the claims.
C. The Body as Property
When people enter into a paid surrogacy arrangement, body
parts-and even more troubling, perhaps whole bodies-are on
the block. When the surrogate is to be both genetic and gesta-
385
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tional, the contracting couple is buying the surrogate's reproduc-
tive services and egg. Debate goes on over whether the couple
are buying a child as well.
In other realms, there has already been an explicit and de-
veloped discussion of the propriety of treating body parts as
property. 2 But the treatment of body parts as property remains
confused. In the field of organ transplantation, the debate about
the propriety of payment for solid organs such as kidneys has
resulted in a statutory ban."3 Yet we allow payment for blood
plasma, and indeed sperm is bought and sold-sperm donors re-
ceive a small fee for donating to a sperm bank and users pay for
impregnation with that sperm.3 4 Recent litigation has raised the
question of whether a person has property rights in valuable
cells cloned from an excised tumor. 5
Outside the realm of reproduction, the debate about
whether to allow the treatment of the body as property focuses
on several concerns: protecting people from commercial incen-
tives that might overwhelm their interest in bodily integrity;
preserving the quality of the body-parts supply by eliminating a
monetary incentive that appeals especially to those with low
quality parts; avoiding the creation of a group of people whose
function is to supply "spare parts" for those of greater financial
means; and preventing the treatment of people as mere means
and not ends. What public policy these concerns advise when
32. See Murray, Gifts of the Body and the Needs of Strangers, 17 HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 30 (Apr. 1987); Andrews, My Body, My Property, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28
(Oct. 1986); Royston, Cell Lines From Human Patients: Who Owns Them? A Case Re-
port, 33 CLINICAL RESEARCH 442 (1985); Wagner, The Legal Impact of Patient Materials
Used for Product Development in the Biomedical Industry, 33 CLINICAL RESEARCH 444
(1985); Caplan, Blood, Sweat, Tears, and Profits: The Ethics of the Sale and Use of
Patient Derived Materials in Biomedicine, 33 CLINICAL RESEARCH 448 (1985); Prottas,
Encouraging Altruism: Public Attitudes and the Marketing of Organ Donations, 61
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 278 (1983); R. SCOTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY (1982); Note,
The Sale of Body Parts, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1215 (1974); R. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATION-
SHIP (1971).
33. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 273-74e (West. Supp. 1986).
34. See NEw CONCEPTIONS, supra note 16, at 154, 156-57; For One Man, Acting as a
Donor Has Been Awkward but Gratifying, Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 1987, at 31, col. 5; Dun-
stan, Moral and Social Issues Arising from A.I.D., in Law and Ethics of A.I.D. and Em-
bryo Transfer, CIBA FOUNDATION SYMPOSIUM 17 (1973). But see WARNOCK, supra note 16,
at 27-28 (raising concerns about payment to donor).
35. See Culliton, Mo Cell Case has its First Court Hearing, 226 SCIENCE 813 (1984);
see also Sun, Scientists Settle Cell Line Dispute, 220 SCIENCE 393 (1983).
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applied to surrogacy is debatable. But commerce in body parts
in the context of surrogacy raises even more issues than in other
contexts such as organ transplantation for one clear reason: the
spectre of baby-buying.
At the heart of commercial surrogacy lies a dilemma. On the
one hand, if we allow it at all, then we are permitting surrogates
to sell reproductive goods and services and to alienate their pa-
rental rights. On the other hand, because of the nearly universal
prohibition on baby-buying, at the point of the final surrender
of the child we have to draw a line and declare that the child
itself is not being bought. At least one commentator has noted
with discomfort this required turnabout."6
The usual resolution of this dilemma is to point out that
surrogacy can easily be distinguished from those practices that
legislatures meant to prohibit in passing the baby-selling stat-
utes. 7 Those statutes were, of course, a response to the black
market in babies.38 The prohibition protects the poor and unwed
mother whose willingness to care for her child may be overcome
by her financial neediness.3 9 The surrogate is in a different situa-
tion from the unfortunate mother who finds herself trapped in a
pregnancy neither planned nor affordable. The surrogate decides
whether to accept the money and give up the child before the
child is ever conceived. The surrogate can just walk away from
the offered deal, none the worse. She has the freedom of choice.
Nor need surrogacy return us to an era of black-market ba-
bies. Agreement is widespread-though not universal-that sur-
rogacy, if permitted, should be regulated by the state. It is the
unregulated, not the regulated, practice of surrogacy that threat-
ens a return to unscrutinized and uncontrolled traffic in chil-
dren. Regulation, on the other hand, could standardize practices,
mandate accountability, and drive the unscrupulous out of
business.
Moreover, in the surrogacy context it is the child's father
himself who is paying. It is often argued that a father cannot
36. See Annas, Baby M: Babies (and Justice) for Sale, 17 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 13
(June 1987).
37. See, e.g., Surrogate Parenting Associates v. Corn. ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d
209, 211-12 (Ky. 1986).
38. See Katz, supra note 26, at 8-9.
39. See Surrogate Parenting Associates, 704 S.W.2d at 211-12.
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buy his own child; he is paying for the surrogate's services, not
the child as a commodity.' 0 Indeed, surrogacy agreements are
often drawn, as in Baby "M," to exclude the wife of the con-
tracting couple, in order to avoid running afoul of the baby-sell-
ing statutes' prohibition of payment in connection with an
adoption. 1
All of these arguments as to why commercial surrogacy does
not violate the baby-selling statutes are fine as far as they go.
But they leave one in an odd position: conceptualizing the
"thing" being sold purely as the surrogate's services (and per-
haps body parts)-not the baby. The child is plucked from the
picture. By lopping off a part of the problem, we are left focus-
ing only on the questions (albeit substantial) of how to handle
the surrogate's trafficking in her own body parts and services. If
we want to get tough and enforce her commercial agreement in
specific performance, so be it.
Yet this ignores the question of whether that kind of en-
forcement carries us too far down the road toward the com-
modification of children. It is too simple and mechanical to rely
on the easy exercise of distinguishing the baby-selling statutes to
allay our fears about commodification. It would be wiser to look
beyond that exercise, recognizing that surrogacy is new territory
not contemplated by those statutes. We need to acknowledge
and explore the extent to which surrogacy is the payment of
money for children, and then answer the policy and legal ques-
tion of whether we should tolerate and specifically enforce it.
The baby-selling statutes are, after all, only one clue to this
society's view of the matter. A rule against the sale of people has
other roots in this country as well-the abolition of slavery. At
one time one could indeed buy and sell people. The thirteenth
amendment2 is the constitutional rejection of slavery, the legal
side of a broader cultural rejection.
Yet our public policy on baby-selling is complex. The prohi-
bition against baby-selling has not been construed as a blanket
condemnation of the payment of any money in connection with
adoption. Paying the gestational mother's expenses is allowed;
40. See, e.g., Baby "M," 217 N.J. Super. at 372, 525 A.2d at 1157.
41. Id. at 374, 525 A.2d at 1158.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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paying the private adoption agency's fee is allowed; paying the
lawyer who handles the legal necessities is allowed."3 What may
appear at first reading to be the banishment of all payment from
the transaction is something narrower: the destruction of a black
market in babies. Simply paying money to acquire a child can-
not be baby purchase or many adoptions would fit the mold as
well; so would every purchase of sperm for artificial insemina-
tion; so would paying for in vitro fertilization at a clinic; and so
would agreeing to an adjustment in alimony to secure custody of
a child.
It will not work simply to distinguish the baby-selling stat-
utes and then ignore the question of how far we want to go in
the commodification of the child in surrogacy. Our policy and
attitudes toward paying money for a child are more complex and
ambivalent." It is necessary to recognize straightforwardly that
surrogacy involves not only commerce in body parts and ser-
vices, but to some extent the payment of money for a child. In
then determining whether we will tolerate surrogacy, and what
methods of enforcement should apply to surrogacy agreements,
concerns about the commodification of the child remain in the
equation rather than dropping out.
The answer to all three of the conflicts I have considered in
Part II lies not in avoiding our ambivalence but accepting it.
Surrogacy does involve the marketing of body services and parts
and to some extent the payment of money for a child despite the
societal ambivalence; the surrogate's relationship with the child
is simultaneously commercial and personal; and all of the multi-
ple collaborators in producing a child have genuinely parental
claims to assert.
43. See Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U.L. REv. 59, 60,
71-72 (1987); Charvey, The Rebirth of Private Adoptions, 71 A.B.A. J. 52, 54 (June 1985);
Myers, Independent Adoptions: Is the Black and White Beginning to Appear in the
Controversy over Grey-Market Adoptions? 18 DuQ. L. REv. 629, 638 (1980); GREEN &
LONG, supra note 18, at 66.
44. Cf. Posner, supra note 43, at 72 ("[W]e have legal baby selling today; the ques-
tion of public policy is not whether baby selling should be forbidden or allowed but how
extensively it should be regulated.").
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III. THE PROBLEM WITH SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
In the above section, I have tried to show the allure of re-
sponding to a surrogate who wishes to keep the child by enforc-
ing the contract in specific performance. Having discussed why
that response is a quick and inadequate fix for a problem whose
complexity should not be avoided so readily, I want to formulate
here more precisely the problem with specific performance.
First, however, the reasons for enforcing the contract at all must
be acknowledged.
A. Why Enforce The Contract At All?
As stated in the Introduction, the focus of this article is not
on the pros and cons of allowing surrogacy but rather on the
means of enforcing the agreement. Yet it is necessary to pause
and at least acknowledge the reasons why the question of how to
enforce arises.
Many will debate in the years ahead whether surrogacy
should be allowed, discouraged, or banned. Infertility, however,
is with us and the number of couples suffering from it is sub-
stantial. 5 Surrogacy offers the only way for couples with some
forms of infertility to have a child with a genetic relationship to
at least one of them. Many couples, whether rightly or wrongly,
appear to value that genetic connection and prefer surrogacy to
adoption. Hence there is a demand for surrogacy, and one likely
to persist.
A ban on surrogacy would probably drive the practice un-
derground, not effectively eradicate it, and the children pro-
duced would pay the heaviest price. Produced outside the law,
through a practice conducted by unregulated intermediaries,
they would be a new class of black-market babies. A ban would
also leave consumers and surrogates who illicitly participated in
the practice unprotected from each other and the
intermediaries.
Aside from these pragmatic concerns, serious doubts have
been voiced about the constitutionality of a ban.4 If the rights
45. NEW CONCEPTIONS, supra note 16, at 2 ("Today, 15 percent of all married couples
are infertile.").
46. Robertson, Surrogate Contracts Not Against Public Policy, N.J.L.J., Feb. 26,
1987, at 332; Procreative Liberty, supra note 31, at 961 & n. 69, 1002-03, 1013.
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of privacy and procreative liberty extend to the use of third-
party reproductive collaborators, there may be a constitutional
right to utilize surrogacy, though the state still could, of course,
regulate the practice to protect compelling state interests."'
It might be argued that surrogacy should be tolerated, but
the contracts not enforced."' It is important to see precisely
what this would mean. The courts could not stay out completely:
When a dispute erupts between a surrogate and the contracting
couple over who gets the child, a court cannot and should not
avoid deciding the issue. In any dispute over parental rights the
state and the courts have an unavoidable responsibility to pro-
tect the interests of the child and to settle the question of who
has parental responsibility. But refusing to enforce the contract
at all would make the contest purely a custody and parental
rights dispute. John Robertson has suggested that this would in-
fringe the couple's constitutional right to procreative liberty.49
Beyond the constitutional argument, withholding enforcement
altogether would leave the parties with little incentive to per-
form their obligations if their initial motivation for entering into
the agreement should begin to fray at the edges. Avoiding the
expense and bother of litigation would remain an incentive
backing up the original commitment, but there would be little
else. No party would have any good reason to count on the other
to perform. Thus some type of enforcement is needed.
B. Against Specific Peformance
One common argument against enforcing in specific per-
formance the surrogate's agreement to give up the child5" should
47. See Procreative Liberty, supra note 31, at 959-62.
48. Of course, if one assumes that the right to rear a child cannot be willingly alien-
ated by a surrogate before the child's birth as a matter of constitutional law, see Annas,
supra note 36, then one does not reach the enforcement question that I wish to focus on.
One simply gives the surrogate an absolute opt-out.
49. See Procreative Liberty, supra note 31, at 1014-15; Robertson, Surrogate
Mothers: Not So Novel After All, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28, 32-33 (Oct. 1983) [here-
inafter Not So Novel]; see also Baby "M," 217 N.J. Super. at 384-88, 525 A.2d at 1163-
66.
50. This is in contrast to the argument against specific enforcement of a surrogate's
contractual promise not to abort. See Baby "M," 217 N.J. Super. at 375, 525 A.2d at
1159. On abortion, the argument is based on the constitutional right recognized in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and its progeny. See also Note, Rumpelstiltskin Revisited:
The Inalienable Rights of Surrogate Mothers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (1986) [hereinafter
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be dismissed from the start. That is the argument that the con-
tract should be regarded as one for services, and specific per-
formance is not available to enforce a contract for services."
This is often recited as a matter of hornbook law.2
The argument fails for several reasons.5 First, the courts
usually will not enforce a contract for services in specific per-
formance because they will not force the parties to remain in the
relationship ordained by contract once that relationship has
gone sour. Secondly, the courts will not award a remedy that
cannot be enforced; commanding the rendering of services is a
problem because of the difficulty in monitoring the quality and
adequacy of the performance. In the classic example, when an
opera singer refuses to perform, the remedy is not to force her
out on stage. Instead, it is to exact damages, and perhaps to
enjoin her from singing elsewhere that night.
The problem is that once a surrogate has given birth and
produced the child neither of these reasons for avoiding specific
peformance applies. At that point, enforcing her surrender of
the child does not lock the parties into an ongoing relationship.
Indeed, quite the opposite is the case-it is the basis for sever-
ing their relationship. Moreover, the adequacy of perfor-
mance is easy to monitor; all that is demanded is surrender of
both the child and parental rights. Therefore, the basic rationale
for withholding the remedy of specific performance when a ser-
Rumpelstiltskin] (arguing that the right to abort is inalienable, but not necessarily the
right to rear the child). But see Annas, supra note 36, at 15 (arguing that rearing rights
are inalienable pre-birth). Also, pre-birth performance of the surrogacy agreement would
be services that should not be compelled for the hornbook reasons discussed in the text.
Cf. Not So Novel, supra note 49, at 33 (the surrogate's promise not to abort should not
be enforced in specific performance "because of the difficulty in enforcing or monitoring
the order [to continue the pregnancy];" the surrogate should pay damages instead).
51. See, e.g., Haddon, Contract Cannot Be Specifically Enforced, N.J.L.J., Feb. 26,
1987, at 31, 31-32; Frug, Breach Remedy Limited to Restitution, N.J.L.J., Feb. 26, 1987,
at 33, 34.
52. See, e.g., Haddon, supra note 51, at 31-32 n.10.
53. I am indebted to Dean Norman Redlich for suggesting this.
54. On the usual unavailability of specific performance as a remedy for a breach of
contract for personal services see 5A A. CORBIN, A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE
WORKING RULES OF CONTRACT LAW, § 1204, at 400-01, § 1206, at 412, § 1208, at 415
(1964); 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 1450, at 1045-46 (3d
ed. 1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 (1981). But see Kronman, Spe-
cific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 356-57 (1978) ("Occasionally, an employment
or construction contract will also be specifically enforced." (footnotes omitted)).
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vice contract is breached does not apply. Indeed, the trial court
judge in Baby "M" concluded that the contract was one for ser-
vices but enforced it in specific performance anyway."
Moreover, a surrogate's refusal to surrender the child looks
very much like a refusal to deliver the end product of her now
largely completed services, rather than simply a refusal to per-
form the services that would produce the product. Thus the ar-
guments against enforcing a promise of services in specific per-
formance would seem not to apply.
The advocates of the position that surrogacy contracts are
purely service contracts have been forced into that position by
the desire to avoid seeing the child as in any way a product" to
be transferred. In part, that desire has been based on the fear
that the contrary view would place surrogacy in violation of the
baby-selling statutes, because then the fee paid would be for the
purchase of a child, not a fee for services. As I have argued
above, however, surrogacy is easily distinguished from the sce-
nario addressed by the baby-selling statutes, without changing
the fact that a surrogacy contract is in part an agreement to pro-
duce and surrender a child for a fee.
Having established that the usual argument against specific
performance does not work, why not go ahead and treat surro-
gacy as an ordinary commercial transaction, forcing the parties
to live up to their deal?
1. Commodification and Use of the Child
There are a number of reasons to look skeptically upon spe-
cific performance as the contractual remedy. One reason is that
the "object" in dispute is no object at all, but a child. I have
suggested that surrogacy does involve some commodification of
the child, as does any arrangement involving payment that re-
55. See Baby "M," 217 N.J. Super. at 372, 398, 525 A.2d at 1157, 1170-71.
56. Calling a child a "product" offends our sensibilities. Cf. Radin, supra note 14, at
1859, 1870, 1925, 1927-28 ("we do not fear relinquishment of children unless it is accom-
panied by market rhetoric"); Frankel & Miller, The Inapplicability of Market Theory to
Adoptions, 67 B.U.L. REV. 99, 101 (1987) (objecting to "describing the adoption system in
the language of economics-'market,' 'commodity' "). Yet there is presently no good al-
ternative term that respects the child's humanity, while acknowledging that the child has
been produced for a fee pursuant to a contract and now, after birth, is supposed to be
surrendered. Perhaps we need to invent a new term.
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sults in obtaining a child. But we can and should limit the ex-
tent of commodification. The mere fact that an agreement exists
between private parties to transfer the child does not mean that
when a court is called upon to remedy a breach of that agree-
ment, the right answer is to enforce what is written on the piece
of paper. Courts that deal with matters affecting the welfare of
children have an unavoidable responsibility to inquire into what
will serve the child's interests and welfare, over and above
whatever private agreements exist. If a surrogacy contract were
instead a contract for the sale of a widget or a toaster, then en-
forcing the agreement in standard commercial terms would be
appropriate and would serve the public good. But a child is not
a widget. Even if the grounds for specific performance were oth-
erwise present, the fact that the contract concerns a child means
that unthinking enforcement of the contract serves neither the
child's nor the public's good.
In the Baby "M" case, the trial court concluded that specific
performance and the child's interest pointed to the same resolu-
tion. It may be tempting to generalize from that a rule of spe-
cific performance for all surrogacy contracts. Yet it is easy to
imagine cases in which that rule would be more troubling: What
if the contracting couple separate and divorce during gestation
while the surrogate's home and marriage remain intact? What if
both members of the couple have entered into the contractual
arrangement with the surrogate, but the father dies before the
birth? What if it is the couple and not the surrogate who flout
the court's authority, lie, attempt to run off with the child, and
threaten the child's life? In none of these cases is specific en-
forcement of the surrogate's promise to surrender the child so
appealing. Indeed, it is interesting to ponder the unlikely 7 but
conceivable scenario in which the class characteristics of the sur-
rogate and couple are reversed-the surrogate is a pediatrician
married to a chemist, while the contracting father is a sanitation
engineer with a history of alchoholism married to a tenth-grade
dropout. The enthusiasm for specific performance might not run
nearly as high.
In the Baby -'M" case, the court purported to temper the
57. It is unlikely because surrogacy costs about $20,000. See KEANE & BREO, supra
note 16, at 269.
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remedy of specific performance by conditioning award of that
remedy on its serving the child's best interests. Yet, in applica-
tion, this offered little modification. To the extent the inquiry
into "best interests" altered the picture at all, it converted the
child from a commodity to a pawn. The child was awarded as
would vindicate the court's outrage and reward the couple's good
behavior.
Although there are many possible definitions of "best inter-
ests," the judge in the Baby "M" case used a nine-point test:58
(1) "Was the child wanted and planned for?"-This always
favors the contracting couple since it is they who wanted and
contracted for the child.
(2) "What is the emotional stability of the people in the
child's home environment?"-The Baby "M" judge found the
surrogate's panicked attempts to keep the child to be damning.
To the extent a surrogate's change of heart about surrendering
the child results in desperate attempts at the time of the birth
to hold on to the child, it counts against her. This point too will
favor the contracting couple.
(3) "What is the stability and peacefulness of the fami-
lies?"-Depending on circumstances in the two families, this
theoretically could weigh in either direction. The judge in the
Baby "M" case criticized the surrogate for being "thoroughly en-
meshed" with the child and "impulsive." If that means bonded
to the baby and desperate to hold on to her, this factor will
favor the couple, since bonding can be expected between a
mother and child.
(4) "What is the ability of the subject adults to recognize
and respond to the child's physical and emotional needs?"-The
Baby "M" judge here noted that the surrogate was emotionally
over-invested in the child while the couple was not. This may
really mean that the surrogate was fighting an uphill battle to
hold on to the child while the couple felt less threatened or were
holding back emotional investment until the resolution of the
case. To that extent, this factor will usually favor the con-
tracting couple.
(5) -"What are the family attitudes towards education and
58. Baby "M," 217 N.J. Super. at 392-98, 525 A.2d at 1167-70 (with the nine
sentences quoted below in text).
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their motivation to encourage curiosity and learning?"-This
will always favor the more educated parties. That will almost
inevitably be the contracting couple, because they are the buy-
ers, likely to be more affluent.
(6) "What is the ability of the adults to make rational
judgements?"-The Baby "M" judge found the surrogate to be
impulsive in crises. To the extent this gives a black mark to any
surrogate who changes her mind about surrendering the child
upon bonding at birth, this factor again systematically favors the
couple.
(7) "What is the capacity of the adults in the child's life to
instill positive attitudes about matters concerning
health?"-This theoretically could favor either side. Yet here
again in Baby "M," class differences came to the fore: The fact
that the wife of the contracting father was a pediatrician
counted in her favor, in contrast to the surrogate who had no
profession or occupation outside the home and care of her other
children.
(8) "What is the capacity of the adults in the baby's life to
explain the circumstances of origin with least confusion and
greatest emotional support?"-Here the Baby "M" judge faulted
the surrogate for, among other things, showing little empathy for
the couple. Yet it is hard to imagine how any surrogate who had
bonded to the child, then had her forcibly taken away at the
couple's behest, would show much empathy. At the same time,
the court credited the couple with a willingness to seek advice
from professionals (like themselves) on how and what to tell the
child. This, too, may be a reflection of class differences. If the
surrogate's lack of empathy for the couple and the couple's will-
ingness to consult professionals figure largely in this calculation,
this point too may systematically favor the couple.
(9) "Which adults would better help the child cope with her
own life?"-The Baby "M" judge faulted the surrogate who
changed her mind with having difficulty coping in a crisis. He
credited the couple, whose single goal throughout had been to
obtain the child, with showing "no aberration." This point will
also tend to favor the couple.
The court in Baby "M" after pursuing the nine points, went
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on to examine the "climate" offered by each family.5 9 The court
stated that it was "satisfied ... that Mrs. Whitehead is unreli-
able as far as her promise is concerned. She breached her con-
tract without regard to her legal obligations."60 Any surrogate
who changes her mind will fail on this point. The judge also reit-
erated that she was "too enmeshed" with the child. 1 A surro-
gate who bonds with the newborn and fights to keep her will
probably fail on this score as well. The court again emphasized
the educational and economic differences that will almost always
also favor the couple.
"Best interests" is supposedly modifying and correcting a
specific enforcement remedy here. It is important, however, to
see what a Baby "M"-style "best interests" consideration does
and does not accomplish.
To the extent that under the "best interests" rubric the
judge faults the surrogate for breaching her contractual obliga-
tions, the "best interests" consideration provides no modifica-
tion at all to specific enforcement. The judge merely reinforces
the conclusion that failing to surrender the child is an adequate
basis for forcing the surrogate to do so. The same goes for other
points in the "best interests" analysis that rely on the structure
of the conflict over the child to favor the couple systematically
(for instance, the couple, not the surrogate, planned for the
child; the surrogate is desperately attached to the child emotion-
ally, lacking empathy for the couple). It is not obvious that any
of these considerations have much to do with the question of
which placement will be better for the child once the storm of
litigation is concluded and the business of living a life is at hand.
If "best interests" were to serve as a real check on specific en-
forcement, the focus in the evaluation would not be on a reitera-
tion of the structure of the dispute in litigation, but on what the
rest of life for this child would be like in each of these two
families.
The question of whether class concerns-education, money,
and the like-should figure in answering that question is a broad
topic for another day. Others have explored the questions of how
59. Id. at 395-98, 525 A.2d at 1169-70.
60. Id. at 396, 525 A.2d at 1169.
61. Id. at 396, 525 A.2d at 1170.
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class and life style should weigh in "best interests" determina-
tions. Suffice it to say that in the surrogacy context, if "best in-
terests" is supposed to function as a corrective to specific en-
forcement, considering class differences will almost always
simply reinforce rather than modify the specific performance
remedy. Because the couple will nearly always be more privi-
leged than the surrogate, both this piece of the "best interests"
calculus and specific enforcement will point toward the couple.
It is, of course, a good question whether the better educated,
more monied family necessarily offers a better placement for the
child.
I have thus far considered the court's examination of the
surrogate's breach of her contractual obligations, the structure
of the dispute, and class differences. Equally troubling is the
fact that the Baby "M" judge counted the surrogate's disobedi-
ence of the court as another strike against her in the "best inter-
ests" calculation.
Mrs. Whitehead testified to what she chose to, exercising
a selective memory, intentionally not recalling or outright
lying on the witness stand. . . . This fundamental inabil-
ity to speak the truth establishes a tarnished Whitehead
environment.
* ' * The judgement-making ability of Mrs. White-
head is sorely tested. One outstanding example was her
decision to run away in the face of a court order. While
she claims fear of the system made her do it this court
sees it, minimally, as a disregard of her legal and civic
obligation to respond to a court's order, and, maximally,
as a contempt of the court order. ...
• . . [Mr. and Mrs. Stern] have obeyed the law.2
While the surrogate's behavior may well have amounted to
contempt and understandably angered the court, to pack this
too into a consideration of whether the child's "best interests"
militate against specific performance is surely packing in too
much. We are here not talking about a corrective to specific en-
forcement based on the child's interests, but an outrage based
on the interests and authority of the court. We may also be talk-
62. Id. at 396-98, 525 A.2d at 1169-70.
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ing about some kind of balancing of the equities: The quotation
above contrasts the couple's clean hands with the surrogate's
soiled ones. The focus, however, is not on the child.
The "best interests" modification to specific performance,
as the Baby "M" judge applied it, is really no modifier at all. It
is a reiteration of some of the reasons why the judge is inclined
to award specific performance in the first place: The surrogate
breached her promise, she angered the court, the equities favor
the couple in the court's view, and the couple is of a higher class.
Yet even if the "best interests" calculus were drastically im-
proved to center genuinely on which placement would best serve
the child, difficulties would remain. First, any "best interests"
analysis applied to a newborn child is problematic. The child
has no history with either family, so neither family has any track
record with that child to examine. Moreover, in a surrogacy con-
text, the competing families are likely to be quite different from
one another, unlike a couple who once formed a family unit. The
child's interests, consequently, are bound to be enormously spec-
ulative and the comparison of families will turn into a compari-
son of apples and oranges. Thus in most cases the child's "best
interests" will provide little, if any, guidance.
In any case, the excessive commodification of the child en-
tailed by specific enforcement remains troubling even if "best
interests" is supposed to function as a corrective.
2. Ignoring Parental Claims
Specific performance also ignores the fact that the surro-
gate's claim is a parental one. One could argue that her parental
claim means that the current laws on custody, adoption, and ter-
mination of parental rights apply. 3 The Baby "M" judge re-
jected this, reasoning that the legislature did not have surrogacy
in mind when it enacted those statutes." The underlying ques-
tion in any event is whether those laws or the policies they em-
body ought to apply to surrogacy. If the answer to either is yes,
then specific performance cannot serve as the remedy.
Some would argue for the strict enforcement of surrogacy
63. The surrogate argued this in Baby "M." This position prevailed in Surrogate
Parenting Associates v. Com. ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 212-13 (Ky. 1986).
64. Baby "M," 217 N.J. Super. at 372-73, 375, 525 A.2d at 1157-59.
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contracts as if we were writing on a clean slate with no experi-
ence with mother/child bonding and the process of consent to
adoption, no history of wrestling with how to handle the mother
who feels driven at birth to keep her child or concludes after
consenting to adoption that she has made a mistake. They
would ignore the tradition of legislation that crafts a solution to
accommodate in some humane way both the mother attached to
her child and the awaiting couple whose hopes of getting that
child are disappointed. Yet the slate is not clean. The law al-
ready recognizes what everyone knows as a matter of common
sense: A parent can be unexpectedly smitten with profound con-
nection to the newborn child at birth, and a parent who tries
(for whatever reason) to give a child away, can find it impossible
to go through with the parting."5
In many states, the statutory law on terminating parental
rights and adoption recognizes that the time around the birth of
a child is a period when even a mother who was previously de-
termined to surrender her child may change her mind.6 Psy-
chologists and other students of the phenomenon recognize birth
as a time of mother/child bonding.17 A mother who has gone
through an entire pregnancy determined to give up the baby,
may at birth bond anyway and find it impossible to surrender
the child. In a number of states the law prohibits an effective
agreement to surrender the child until a certain number of days
after the birth. This allows a mother time to bond with the
child and to reconsider any prior decision to give the child up.
65. Even the law on contracts much more ordinary than surrogacy contracts recog-
nizes that in some cases it is too harsh to hold people to performance of their prior
agreement. The law provides cooling-off periods for some kinds of contracts, such as
door-to-door sales contracts. There is a recognition that in some circumstances the will-
ingness to enter into an agreement will later be overcome by a realization that the agree-
ment was ill-advised, and the reasonable and humane policy is to allow the time for
people to change their minds and free themselves of the contractual obligation.
66. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 600A .4 (2)(d) (West 1981) (requiring 72-hour waiting
period after child's birth before parents' execution of a written release of custody); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.500 (5) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982 & Supp. 1986) (five-day wait-
ing period); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 2 (West 1987) (four-day waiting period
before written consent to adoption allowed); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-5A-4 (1984 &
Supp. 1987) (five-day waiting period).
67. See Cohen, Surrogate Mothers: Whose Baby Is It? 10 AM. J. L. & MED. 243, 260-
62 (1984) and sources cited therein; Klaff, The Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70
CALIF. L. REV. 335, 344-46 (1982) and sources cited therein.
68. See, e.g., NEW CONCEPTIONS, supra note 16, at 207; supra note 66.
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Moreover, in many states, even after a mother has crossed
that bridge and consented to adoption, she can revoke her con-
sent for a limited period of time." The consequences of her re-
vocation may not be that she automatically keeps the child-it
may instead trigger a judicial hearing to decide that question. 0
The point is that the law already allows for the fact that a
mother may bond with the child at birth or change her mind
about giving the child up for adoption.
Moreover, parental rights are not terminated against the
will of the parent, absent a showing that he or she is unfit.
71
There are elaborate protections to prevent termination on a
lesser showing.
In a surrogacy case, unlike a usual termination of parental
rights or adoption, the awaiting couple has more than disap-
pointed expectations; the male has a genetic connection to the
child. But the point is that he is not the only parent. The surro-
gate is a parent as well. To embrace specific enforcement is to
reject that reality, and ignore entirely an elaborate set of policy
determinations we have already made about how parental rights
should be severed.
3. Awarding Extraordinary Relief to Sever Parental Ties
The remedy of specific performance is an extraordinary
equitable remedy, placing the full power of the state behind the
enforcement of the affirmative order. If the surrogate fails to
comply with the order, a contempt citation, police enforcement,
and jail stand waiting. Because specific enforcement involves the
state to such an extraordinary degree and commits the state to
backing a private contract with public force, the remedy is an
unusual one subject to limitations.
It is hornbook law that specific performance is not available
when the contractual promise is contrary to public policy.72 The
previous section discusses the public policy embodied in the
statutes on adoption and terminating parental rights. A contract
that summarily eliminates a surrogate's parental claim despite
69. See supra notes 23-25.
70. See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 115-b (McKinney Supp. 1988).
71. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); In re P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah
1982).
72. See WILLISTON, supra note 54, § 1429, at 867.
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her change of heart at birth and contemplates no remedy other
than specific performance is obviously at odds.
Specific enforcement commits the state with all of its coer-
cive powers to stand behind some of the most troubling aspects
of a surrogacy arrangement-the surrender of a child in a com-
mercial arrangement, the discouragement of bonding and love
between a mother and child, and the treatment of a woman giv-
ing birth as if she were simply producing a product to be handed
over. The symbolism of maximal state enforcement of these as-
pects is disquieting, especially when there is an alternative.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE
The choice need not be between specific enforcement and
no enforcement at all. There is another option-enforcement in
damages, the usual remedy for breach of contract. Indeed,
before the Baby "M" case, a number of legal commentators con-
cluded that the courts would not order specific enforcement in
such a scenario; there was also some suggestion that an award of
damages might be appropriate.73
A. Damages
A surrogacy contract embodies the intent of the parties and
by the time of birth all have acted in reliance upon it. Breach of
the surrogacy contract should generate a right to the return of
the surrogacy fee since the surrogate has failed to complete the
expected services by surrendering the child. The contract may
also generate a right to damages for expenses incurred in reli-
ance that cannot be mitigated. What further damages the await-
ing couple suffers will depend on who gets the child.
Some will argue, as indeed the court stated in Baby "M,"7
73. See Cohen, supra note 67, at 260 ("Commentators have noted that courts would
not be likely to take a child from a natural mother who breaches a contract." (footnote
omitted)); Rumpelstiltskin, supra note 50, at 1936 n.4 ("without an authorizing statute,
courts would not likely grant specific performance," citing references); cf. Not So Novel,
supra note 49, at 33 (a court could order a surrogate to relinquish the child, depending
on whether the court found the surrogate's or couple's interest in rearing the child to be
greater; but if the surrogate prevails, the couple should have other remedies, including
perhaps money damages); Procreative Liberty, supra note 31, at 1015 (acknowledging
case for damages but recommending specific performance for purely gestational
surrogacy).
74. Baby "M," 217 N.J. Super. at 389, 525 A.2d at 1166.
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that damages are an inadequate remedy-that only the child
herself will do.15 It is undoubtedly true that damages supply
only limited recompense for a child. Yet there are many circum-
stances in which we make do with damages even though they are
a form of relief that is less than entirely satisfying to the claim-
ant, because there are competing values at stake. When a valu-
able and perhaps irreplaceable employee breaks an employment
contract, for example, the remedy is not to force the employee to
stay. The only way to fully cure the inadequacies of damages in
the surrogacy context is to insist on specific performance. This
article is an attempt to argue that the costs of that approach are
too great.7 As a societal matter, we must opt for the imperfec-
tions of damages rather than the profound problems of specific
enforcement.
B. Custody
A damages award can be coupled with one of two different
resolutions of the custody and parental rights issues: (a) surro-
gates could be able to opt out of actual performance absolutely,
paying damages but retaining the child, with fathers relegated to
noncustodial rights, if anything; or (b) when a surrogate wishes
to keep the child, a judge could determine the parental rights
issues case by case, with the surrogate liable for unmitigated
damages. I favor the latter.
Both resolutions have pros and cons. The primary disadvan-
tage of the former is that it sacrifices the custodial portion of the
father's parental claim at the very least. The disanalogy with
adoption is relevant. As noted above, many states prevent a
woman's commitment to give up the child until after birth and
an opportunity to bond. But that absolute right to opt out of
surrendering the child occurs when the would-be recipients have
no parental claims of their own. Given the criticisms above of
failing to recognize the parental nature of the surrogate's claim,
75. On the need for specific performance to enforce entitlements to unique goods, see
Kronman, supra note 54, at 355-65; Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89
YALE L.J. 271, 272 (1979).
76. Cf. Radin, supra note 14, at 1934 n.293 (the alternative to making surrogacy mar-
ket-inalienable "is to create an incomplete commodification" of surrogacy; then "women
who change their minds should not be forced to perform," though there should be "a
reasonable time limit during which [the surrogate] must make up her mind").
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it would be ironic and inconsistent to summarily reject the claim
of the father.
The main disadvantage of the second alternative is that
when a surrogate wishes to keep the child, it will trigger a court
battle and uncertainty for a period of time as to parental rights
and relationships. More Baby "M" cases would hardly seem
desirable.
Yet as legislatures set the standards to be applied and
ground rules for such disputes, the likelihood of another case as
time-consuming and demanding as Baby "M" will diminish. The
Baby "M" judge had little to guide him.
Still, any uncertainty and any battle over custody and pa-
rental rights imposes psychological and other costs on all in-
volved, including the child. The problem is that there is no good
alternative. Specific performance avoids the uncertainty and
simplifies the battle, but it ignores the surrogate's parental claim
and has the additional problems this article suggests. At the
other extreme, allowing the surrogate to opt out and retain the
child in all cases seems to ignore the father's parental invest-
ment and claim. In between, there is the position that allows a
judge to determine-as in other, non-surrogacy contexts-the
array of issues presented: custody, termination of parental
rights, and related issues. The middle solution treats both par-
ties' claims as parental ones. It also avoids the excessive com-
modification of the child that specific performance is prone to
produce.
If a judge is to determine the parental rights issues, I turn
first to the custody dispute and the central question of what
standard the judge is to apply. The usual standard applied to
custody disputes is "the best interests of the child."" Yet, as my
previous discussion of "best interests" has suggested, if both
sides can supply adequate parenting and fit homes, and the
child is a newborn who could flourish with either, focusing on
"the best interests of the child" without considering the strength
of competing parental claims provides no resolution. In order to
eke out an answer using that standard, a judge would have to
resort to comparing two fit homes to see which was
77. Compare J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD (1973).
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"best"-perhaps more affluent or "best" by some other ques-
tionable standard. 8
When a court is deciding between two traditional parents
who conceived and raised the child together before parting, the
"best interests" standard will be dispositive by itself since the
court will be able to examine the child's history with each par-
ent. Moreover, the parental claims are likely to be similar in
some fundamental sense, because the essence of each will be
that the parent has established a relationship with the child. Yet
when a surrogate decides at the birth that she wishes to keep the
child, often neither of these will be the case. As I have indicated,
"best interests" will probably not be decisive. In addition, the
parental claims will most likely be quite different from one an-
other. The male's parental claim will tend to be based in his ge-
netic connection to the child and expectations of custody. The
surrogate's claim will tend to derive from her genetic connection,
nine months of gestation, and the experience of giving birth to
the child. In individual cases there may be added factors (if, for
instance, the father actually is beginning an interactive relation-
78. Cf. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of In-
determinacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 229 (Summer 1975) ("[T]he determination
of what is 'best' or 'least detrimental' for a particular child is usually indeterminate and
speculative. . . . [E]ven if accurate predictions were possible in more cases, our society
today lacks any clear-cut consensus about the values to be used in determining what is
'best' or 'least detrimental.' "); Comment, Assessing Children's Best Interests When a
Parent is Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852,
862 (1985) ("The broad judicial discretion in custody determinations, redeterminations,
and visitation orders, when combined with ignorance or prejudice, leads to decisions
which both rely on and reinforce prevailing stereotypes concerning gay and lesbian par-
ents." (footnote omitted)).
Of course, if one assumes that removing a newborn from the gestational mother to
another parent is harmful to the child, then a "best interests" analysis would resolve the
custody question without resorting to a comparison of competing parental claims. The
mother would then win custody, whether the analysis is denominated a vindication of
the "primary caretaker" or some other version of "best interests." Cf. Garska v. McCoy,
278 S.E.2d 357 (W.Va. 1981) (primary caretaker awarded continued custody). In this
article, however, I do not make that assumption. In addition, because a dispute over
custody and parental rights to a child borne of surrogacy ought to be resolved very
quickly after the child's birth-and is more likely to be after the Baby "M" case (see
infra p. 404)-I also do not assume in this article that the very young infant's "best
interests" will dictate maintaining the custody that is established pending resolution of
the dispute. On both points, compare Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for
Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 531, 561 (1984) (for a child less than
five or six months, experts would probably not be as concerned about separating the
child from the primary caretaker).
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ship with the child, the court will want to take that too into
account). But in most instances when a surrogate is seeking to
retain the newborn, the claims will have their root in these re-
productive connections.
The competing parental claims are thus more disparate
than when parents conceived and initially reared the child to-
gether, both forming a relationship with the child. Indeed, they
are so disparate that to ignore the difference altogether and
award the child on the basis of affluence or some other like fac-
tor under the guise of "the best interests of the child" seems a
positive injustice. After all, if what is at stake is the parental
rights of the litigants, then a substantial difference in their pa-
rental claims is highly relevant. Indeed, there is little else rele-
vant, if both parental placements would serve the child's
interests.
Thus, in a surrogacy case, when the surrogate mother wishes
to keep the child the court should apply a dual standard: "the
best interests of the child" to take account of any gross dispari-
ties in what each family offers the child and to eliminate either
or both homes if unfit, and then-in cases where "best interests"
fails to resolve the question-a comparison of competing paren-
tal claims to determine which parent has the stronger claim to
custody. Applying this dual standard would mean that if the
homes offered by the competing parents showed no gross dispar-
ity in appropriateness for the child, and the surrogate was ge-
netic and gestational and perhaps already beginning to rear the
child, she would probably have a stronger claim than the father
who was simply genetically related to and awaiting the child.
There are several issues that this proposal raises. First, be-
cause a man cannot gestate a child, the father and his wife
would usually lose out in comparison to a genetic and gestational
surrogate, if both were fit families and "best interests" were in-
decisive. This asymmetry adheres in the reproductive process.
The biological reality is that only the woman carries the child
within her for nine months, gives birth to the child, and is sus-
ceptible to mother/child bonding. For his part, the man goes
through the act of contributing his sperm, and months of what
can surely be keen expectation and psychological preparation
with his wife. Yet he does not have the same kind of intimate
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physical connection with the child as the surrogate does.79 These
differences mean that in an individual case the court is likely to
find that it is the mother who has begun a relationship with the
newborn, is more involved, and has greater immediate
responsibility.
Some would question whether such a standard amounts to
the reinstatement of the "maternal preference" or "tender years
presumption"-doctrines that inclined courts to award custody
of very young children to mothers on the assumption that this
was best for the child, until the presumptions became subject to
widespread criticism.80 But the reason for permitting a standard
that will usually allow the genetic and gestational mother to win
has nothing to do with a theory that women make better parents
to young children. Indeed, the comparison of parental claims oc-
curs when the child's "best interests" are not decisive; I assume
that the competing families could parent equally well. The rea-
son is, rather, that when each offers parallel nurturing and "best
interests" produces a draw, the genetic and gestational mother's
parental claim is likely to be stronger at birth81-as a result of
79. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 67, at 260-64; cf. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
397-99, 404-17 (1979) (Stewart, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting) (the unwed mother and
father are not similarly situated with respect to the newborn or infant).
Because the reproductive asymmetry will mean that the surrogate will often win
custody, the father may decide that he wants nothing to do with the child-that he seeks
no relationship and should be exempt from any support obligations. Cf. Field, 4 N.Y.L.S.
Hum. Rts. Ann. - (1987) (arguing that the father should be able to opt out of a
parental relationship with child and then not be liable for support). Because this is an
article on the inappropriateness of specific performance when both parents want the
child, I am focusing on the scenario in which each desires to continue a parental relation-
ship. In such instances, the fight is not over being excused from parental obligations but
obtaining access to the child, through custody, visitation, and the continuation of paren-
tal rights.
80. But see Klaff, supra note 67. See generally Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty
States: An Overview as of August 1, 1981, 7 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 49, 4049, 4063-64
(Oct. 20, 1981) (listing states in which the tender years doctrine is rejected, is used as a
tie-breaker, is "in effect but may be subordinated to best interest of the child," or "is in
effect and gives preference to a 'fit' mother, other factors being equal").
81. See infra note 84 discussing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
Recognition of the biological asymmetry may lead some to suggest that a surrogate
mother should be gestational only; she should have no genetic connection to the child. I
am grateful to Arthur Caplan for first pointing this out to me. The rationale is that this
would probably reduce still further the already small number of surrogate mothers who
change their minds and wish to keep the child. It might also reduce the strength of the
surrogate's claim to the child. Both parents would still have a claim to assert, but you
would not have the scenario in which both have a genetic claim and the surrogate addi-
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gestation, birthing, and the attendant bonding she is likely to
have begun a relationship and involvement.
Some might object, then, that such a standard amounts to
sex discrimination, since only women can gestate. The argument
over whether pregnancy can constitutionally serve as a basis for
preferential treatment and over what theory of sex-based equal-
ity properly handles real biological differences between the sexes
has been pursued at length elsewhere.8 2 In the surrogacy con-
text, if one accepts my prior arguments against resolving the
fight over the child by resort to specific enforcement, and ac-
cepts that the interests of the child by themselves often will not
resolve that fight, there seems little alternative to comparing the
parental claims.8s Considering gestation and birthing, as I have
indicated, allows one to consider fully which parent is already
beginning a relationship, is more involved with, and has more
immediate responsibility for the newborn. To rule those factors
off the course would penalize the parent with greater involve-
ment and assume that women should be considered just like
men in their relationship to a newborn."' Moreover, one could
tionally has one relating to gestation.
82. See, e.g., Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955
(1984); Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special
Treatment Debate, 13 Rev. L. & Soc. Change 325 (1984-85). A full exploration of the
problem of preferential treatment for pregnancy is beyond the scope of this article.
83. Cf. Chambers, supra note 78, at 499-503 (arguing that not only the child's inter-
ests, but also the parents' interests should be considered, and citing types of disputes in
which that already occurs); Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution:
A Jurisprudential Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 28 (1980) ("[Plarents also have
rights of their own that, insofar as they do not impinge on the rights of children, deserve
recognition. Childrearing is one of the ways in which many people fulfill and express
their deepest values about how life is to be lived.").
84. Compare Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), in which the Supreme Court
determined that the mere biological link between an unmarried father and child does not
merit the same constitutional protection as the parental relationship between mother
and child. The Court noted: " 'The mother carries and bears the child, and in this sense
her parental relationship is clear.'" Id. at 260 n.16 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
Taking biological differences into consideration may offend a theory that we should
try to avoid legal recognition of such differences. See Williams, supra note 82. However,
I would argue that it passes muster under theories of equality focusing on the impact of
a rule on the task of achieving societal freedom from gender discrimination. See Law,
supra note 82. As I argue in text, to decide parental rights with respect to the newborn
by ignoring key disparities in the parental claims would work a positive injustice to the
adult whose involvement with and responsibility for the child are greater at birth, usu-
ally the mother. It would pretend that women are like men in their relationship to the
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argue that considering an existing parent/child bond, in order to
maintain rather than breach it, bears a substantial relationship
to important state interests in protecting parent/child
relationships.
Another objection is that this scheme might be taken to
provide an incentive to couples wishing to use a genetic and ges-
tational surrogate to find a woman who would clearly be an unfit
parent. Then if she were to change her mind about relinquishing
the child, they would be surer of getting custody. Unfortunately,
that is the incentive structure we now have. Contracting couples
have no assurance of getting custody if a surrogate wishes to
keep the child. Before the Baby "M" case, there were legal
scholars who anticipated that in such a case the court would not
take the child away from the birth mother and award the child
to the couple.85 Thus the couple's best assurance of ending up
with the child has been to pick a surrogate who a court would
find to be an unfit parent. It has been quite feasible to act on
that as well, because there has been no regulation mandating
that a potential surrogate meet any particular requirements.
Despite the incentive and latitude to choose surrogates who
would be unfit parents, probably few couples have done so.
There are counter-incentives that provide a check: the desire to
choose a woman who has already had children, who has a family,
and who seems psychologically stable-in order to maximize the
chance that she will enter into the arrangement with a sense of
what to expect, to minimize the chance that she will later wish
to keep the child, and to assure that she has a secure and sup-
portive context in which to experience the pregnancy and birth.
Some couples may even feel that a woman with a family and
psychological stability may have a better genetic complement to
pass on to the child and may offer a better gestational environ-
newborn. By ig'noring the special features of a woman's relationship, such an approach
would, in effect, be penalizing.
One could argue that instead of considering biology at all in comparing parental
claims, the court should consider only ultimate issues of who has begun a relationship
with the child, is more involved, and has more responsibility. Yet an acknowledgement of
the reproductive events and an inquiry into what they have yielded in the particular case
seems an intrinsic part of making that ultimate determination.
85. See, e.g., Annas, Contracts to Bear a Child: Compassion or Commercialism? 11




ment for the fetus in utero.
Those checks on the incentive to use an unfit parent as a
surrogate are likely to remain. If state legislatures supply the
needed regulation of surrogacy, we will have additional checks.
State law should require that the professionals involved in sur-
rogacy arrangements perform adequate screening of prospective
surrogates. 6 It is hard to imagine how a blatantly unfit mother
would qualify to be a surrogate if the screening for surrogacy
were professionally responsible.
Another objection to the standard I propose rests on con-
cerns about predictability. The argument is that no couple will
engage a genetic and gestational surrogate if she can change her
mind for some period after birth and keep the child. Yet hun-
dreds of couples have already used the procedure87 despite the
expectation by a number of legal scholars before Baby "M" that
a surrogate could change her mind and keep the child. Nonethe-
less, writing that view into law may indeed encourage some sur-
rogates to change their minds and discourage some couples from
using a genetic and gestational surrogate.
The curb on the surrogate's changing her mind, however, is
the possibility of damages awarded against her and the expense
of defending the suit. As for the couple, the only way of guaran-
teeing them that they will end up with the child despite the sur-
rogate's change of mind is by rejecting the arguments I have
made above against enforcing the deal in specific performance.
C. Beyond Custody: Terminating Parental Rights
When a surrogate changes her mind, the court will have to
decide more than the contract and custody issues-the court will
also have to decide whether the parental rights of the party who
does not get custody should be terminated. My discussion above
about fundamental anxiety over the proliferation of adults in-
volved in a single reproduction who can assert parental claims
suggests that there will be a strong impetus to exclude all but
two adults from the role of parent by terminating any others'
86. Some of the legislative proposals have so required. See, e.g., Note, Surrogate
Motherhood: Contractual Issues and Remedies under Legislative Proposals, 23 WASH-
BURN L.J. 601, 628 & n.157 (1984) (Kansas bill).




Yet as I have argued above there should actually be a strong
presumption against terminating the parental rights of fit and
desiring parents. This suggests that the current standards for
terminating parental rights should apply. Using those standards
the courts already resolve cases involving unmarried parents,
parents who never expected to rear a child together, and parents
who cannot cooperate. It is true that we have very little data
with which to speculate about the effect on the child of having
the constellation of parental figures that a failed surrogacy ar-
rangement would produce if parental rights were terminated on
neither side. Yet there are a number of ways to protect the child
from ill effects short of terminating parental rights en-
tirely-adjustments in custody and visitation rights, perhaps
even suspension of parental contact for a time, if necessary. In
the absence of that data, then, adherence to the traditional stan-
dard would seem in order.
CONCLUSION
Until legislation on surrogacy is enacted, when a surrogate
decides she wishes to keep the child a court will be forced to
resolve the dispute without specific legislative guidance. I recom-
mend above an approach the court should consider. Such legisla-
tion is needed, however, to allow rapid, consistent, and societally
acceptable resolution of that dispute, and to regulate the entire
practice of surrogacy. My arguments suggest that legislation
ought to provide that, for a limited period after the birth, a sur-
rogate can give notice that she wishes to keep the child. This
should trigger a prompt judicial proceeding to determine the pa-
rental and contractual issues as recommended above.
There are a number of proposals for legislation on surrogacy
in the various states;88 different bills recommend different ways
of handling the scenario of the surrogate who changes her
mind.89 The passion of public debate on these proposals and on
the Baby "M" case itself is a critical clue suggesting the scope of
issues that legislation on surrogacy must resolve. This is sound
and fury signifying something of importance-that in surrogacy,




and specifically in the scenario of the surrogate mother who
changes her mind, we have hit bedrock issues on which society is
deeply conflicted. That realization counsels neither denial in the
form of overly simplistic specific performance solutions, nor pa-
ralysis in a refusal to legislate.
Many agree that we need legislation, but go on to propose
legislation that fails to do justice to the issues involved. Any pro-
posal that essentially enforces a specific performance solution is
a wrong and overly simplistic answer. It is a response that fails
to do justice to the genuine complexities discussed above-the
simultaneous commercial and personal character of surrogacy,
the treatment of the body as property and danger of going too
far in the commodification of the child, and the proliferation of
reproductive collaborators with parental claims. Rather than ac-
knowledging and reconciling these complexities, the specific per-
formance proposals treat surrogacy as simply commercial, com-
modify the child excessively, and reject out of hand any
proliferation of parental claims.
We should not ignore the personal, non-commercial, human
side of surrogacy with a solution that is commercial and inhu-
mane. As we embrace reproductive techniques involving donor
gametes, embryo transfer, and surrogacy-the techniques of col-
laborative reproduction-we need not banish humanity from the
reproductive process. It is easy to react in fury to human frailty
in a surrogate. But as she breaks an agreement, she loves her
child. Surely that is a frailty demanding compassion.
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